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Chapter One 
The Impact of Money Laundering and Other Illicit Financial Flows on the Economy of Malawi 
1.1 Introduction  
Money laundering is a global phenomenon that has terrorised the economies of the world. It 
has been described as the process through which people attempt to legitimise illegally obtained 
money by disguising its true nature or source.1 The term ‘laundering’ literally means ‘washing’ 
or ‘removing dirt’.2 The anti-money laundering legal regime, hence, concerns the prevention, 
detection and deterrence of illicit financial flows that have crippled the world economies and 
continue to do so. 
Illicit financial flows have posed a particularly big challenge for the economies of developing 
countries, especially African countries. The African Union – United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa High-level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows recently released a report which 
estimates that the continent of Africa loses about $50 billion to $148 billion annually through 
illicit financial flows.3  Resources that could have been put to better use, for example, for socio-
economic development, are diverted and laundered elsewhere for the private gain of a few 
                                                          
1
 Serafini J ‘Money Laundering’ 41 American Criminal Law Review 887 (2004) available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.ac.za/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&csi=168966&sr=TITLE%28Money+Lau
ndering%29+and+DATE+IS+2004 (accessed on 31 March 2015).  
2
 See also Unger B (2007) “Implementing Money Laundering” in Masciandaro D et al Black Finance: The Economics 
of Money Laundering  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 103-148. 
3
 See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and The African Union Commission High level Panel on Illicit 
Financial Flows from Africa Report (2015) Illicit financial flow: why Africa needs to “track it, stop it and get it” (26 
February 2015). Available at 
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf (accessed on 6 June 
2015). 
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selfish individuals. This situation is exacerbated by the reality that most of the developing 
countries lack sufficient capacity to regulate the financial flows in their economies. 
Money laundering, being a global problem, has prompted the international community to 
respond to it seriously. The first international efforts to combat money laundering were 
directed at outlawing the proceeds of the illicit trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances.4 Today the range of offences targeted by the anti-money laundering regime has 
expanded to include the most common serious criminal offences recognised by the 
international community, including tax evasion, corruption and bribery.5 
Financial institutions such as banks have been the most commonly-used vehicles to launder ill-
gotten money. As a result, over the years, various mechanisms have been put in place to detect 
and report unusual transactions within banks and other financial institutions. The imposition of 
preventive and regulatory measures on financial institutions has forced money launderers to 
explore other means of accumulating and investing the proceeds of crime. 
There is a growing tendency among corrupt state officials and other individuals who engage in 
illicit activities for gainful purposes to use so-called corporate vehicles, including trusts, to 
obscure the trail of dirty money and to conceal the proceeds of crime.6 
                                                          
4
 See the United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988.  
5
 See Articles 14 and 23 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003). 
6
 See FATF Typologies Report on Money Laundering Using Trusts and Company and Company Service Providers 
(October 2010). Available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Money%20Laundering%20Using%20Trust%20and%20Company%20Servic
e%20Providers.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2015). See also Van der Does de Willebois E et al. The Puppet Masters: 
How the Corrupt use the legal structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to do About it (2011) The World Bank: 
Washington. Available at https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf (accessed on 31 
March 2015). 
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The central challenge for the global anti-money laundering effort has been to adapt to the rapid 
changes in the techniques by which money is laundered. 
Most countries in the world now have anti-money laundering laws and regulations in their 
domestic legal systems. This paper seeks to analyse the efficacy of Malawi’s anti-money 
laundering regime, especially insofar as it concerns combating the use of the trust as a vehicle 
for money laundering. 
1.2 Development of the anti-money laundering regime in Malawi 
Malawi is one of the African countries that has been struggling with the scourge of money 
laundering and other related economic crimes. Public corruption is the most common source of 
illicit profits, besides tax evasion7 and the growing of and dealing in Cannabis Sativa (Indian 
hemp).8 
The uncovering in October 2013 of massive looting by Malawian public officials of public funds 
illustrates the extent of corruption and theft within the Malawi civil service. This widely- 
publicised theft has now become known as the ‘Cashgate scandal’. It  involved the treasury 
being swindled out of 13, 671, 396, 751.00 Malawi Kwachas (MK) (Approximately $32 million)9 
within a period of six months.  About 53 criminal case files were opened in respect of suspects 
who, at the time of writing, are facing criminal charges of theft and money laundering.10 Most 
                                                          
7
 See S Yikona, B Slot, M Geller et al Ill-gotten Money and the Economy: Experiences from Malawi and Namibia 
(2011) 25. 
8
 See The FATF Mutual Evaluation Report on Malawi Para. 53. 
9
 See Baker Tilly Report on Fraud and Mismanagement of Malawi Government Finances: Covering transactions and 
controls in the six month period 1 April 2013 – 30 September 2013 (21 February 2014). Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285877/20140221_National_Au
dit_Office_Malawi_-_Forensic_Audit_Report_-_FINAL_ISSUED.pdf (accessed on 6 June 2015). 
10
 IMF (2015) 6. 
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of the cases involve public officials who are alleged to have stolen public funds, using 
companies of which they are the beneficial owners to make bogus payments. 
The former president, Bakili Muluzi, too, is accused of diverting to his personal accounts 
government money amounting to MK1.4 billion (approximately $10 million)11 during his tenure 
as president. These two examples show the vulnerability of the Malawian treasury to 
corruption and embezzlement. As a debt-ridden country, heavily dependent on foreign aid for 
development, Malawi can ill-afford to ignore the repercussions that such scandals attract from 
the side of the donor community. 
Malawi is a member of the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG), a regional grouping, the aim of which is to promote the international anti-money 
laundering standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).12 The FATF is an inter-
governmental body set up in 1989 at the initiative of the Group of Seven (G7) countries and is 
mandated to set worldwide standards in the combating of money laundering, and to monitor 
how they are implemented by countries across the world.13 ESAAMLG, as an associate member 
of the FATF, has the role of overseeing the implementation of the FATF’s Recommendations in 
Eastern and Southern Africa. 
In honouring its international obligations to combat money laundering, Malawi has made 
considerable progress. It is a state party to various international and regional anti-money 
                                                          
11
 See The case of The Republic v. Elson Bakili Muluzi High Court Criminal Case Number 1 of 2009 (Pending). 
12
 See Memorandum of understanding among member governments of ESAAMLG. Available at 
http://www.esaamlg.org/documents_storage/ESAAMLG_MEMORANDUM_OF_UNDERSTANDING.pdf (accessed on 
11 May 2015). 
13
 See the introductory note to The FATF Recommendations: International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (16 February 2012). Available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (accessed 11 May 2015). 
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laundering (AML) instruments, including those aimed against corruption and the financing of 
terrorism. It has ratified the United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Other Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention, 1988), the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo Convention, 2000) and the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC, 2003). In further fulfilment of its 
obligations under the stated Conventions, Malawi enacted the Money Laundering, Proceeds of 
Serious Crimes and Terrorist Financing Act in 2006 to domesticate the anti-money laundering 
regime.14 The Act criminalises money laundering and expresses Malawi’s commitment to 
combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism by imposing obligations on financial 
institutions and other non-designated financial businesses and professions (NDFBPs), in line 
with international AML/CFT standards.  
However, corruption continues to remain a major challenge to development in Malawi,15 
despite the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) under the Corrupt Practices Act 
soon after the country became a multi-party democracy in 1995.16 
A recent World Bank study revealed that in Malawi corruption comes second to tax evasion as 
the largest source of ill-gotten money.17 The study found that the amount of money involved in 
corrupt practices in the country is approximately five per cent of the national gross domestic 
product (GDP), while in the case of tax fraud it is about eight to twelve per cent of the GDP.18 
Such enormous embezzled amounts could have been put to proper use in developing the 
                                                          
14
FATF Mutual Evaluation Report on Malawi (2008) available at 
http://www.esaamlg.org/evaluationreports/Malawi_Report.pdf (accessed 2 March 2015). 
15
 The Republic of Malawi, National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008. 
16
 Chapter 7:04 of the Laws of Malawi. 
17
 Yikona, Slot, Geller et al (2011) 81. 
18
 Yikona, Slot, Geller et al (2011) 29. 
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economy and alleviating poverty. The culprits are hard to catch, for they resort to crafty 
schemes to disguise and hide their illicit gains.  
This research paper focuses on trusts as a vehicle for money laundering. The FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Report on Malawi is critical of the fact that Malawi’s laws regulating trusts do not 
require the registration of private trusts. 19  In effect, it boils down to the fact that the beneficial 
owner of the trust remains unknown. The Report bemoans furthermore the lack of 
transparency regarding how public trusts are funded and the way their assets are managed. 
Most public trusts are set up as charities and associations.20 The absence of a strict regulatory 
legal framework exposes the pitfalls in Malawi’s law relating to trusts, but it also shows what 
still has to be done to strengthen the fight   against money laundering and terrorist financing. 
1.3 The concept of the trust 
The legal concept of trust was developed in the medieval period by the English Court of Equity, 
particularly in the field of property law. The concept was developed to circumvent the 
restrictions of the English common law of property on the transfer of legal title to land during 
one’s lifetime (inter vivos) and after death (post mortem).21 Two types of trusts existed:  a 
general trust and a special trust.22 In a general trust, legal title would be transferred to a third 
party for the benefit of another (cestui que trust).23 In a special trust, a trustee would hold the 
property temporarily for some special purpose, either to look after it while the real owner was 
                                                          
19
 (2008) Paras. 37, 75, 494, 501 and 504. 
20
 (2008) Paras. 38, 518. 
21
 Avin A ‘The Origins of the Mordern English Trust Revisited’ 70 Tulane Law Review 1139 (1996) 1143 available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.ac.za/lnacui2api/results/listview/delPrep.do?cisb=&risb=21_T221027571
22&mode=delivery_DnldRender (accessed 27 May 2015). 
22
 See Avin (1996) 1139. 
23
 Avin (1996) 1143. 
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away, or to manage it in his absence.24 As a result of this arrangement, the third party became 
the title holder, as opposed to the person who transferred the property (the settlor) and the 
beneficiary. The beneficiary had no interests enforceable by the court or at common law. This 
gap was filled by the English ecclesiastical courts, which appointed an officer to investigate the 
matter and recommend a remedy. Later on, with the increased usage of this kind of this legal 
arrangement, the Court of Chancery developed rules that were later known as Equity to 
regulate the trustee and beneficiary relationship. These rules operated separately from the 
common law until they were merged with the common law by the Judicature Acts of 1875. 
1.4 The history of trust law in Malawi 
The concept of trust was incorporated into the laws of Malawi as part of the received law by 
virtue of the British Central Africa Order in Council of 1902, when Malawi was a British 
Protectorate, then known as the British Central Africa Protectorate.25 By virtue of Article 15 (2) 
of the Order in Council, the English common law, statutes of general application, and the 
doctrine of equity became applicable law in the protectorate of Malawi. Malawi’s 
independence constitution of 1966, as well as the current republican, democratic constitution 
of 1994, has maintained the received laws to the extent that they are not repugnant to the 
constitution. 26 However, as long back as 1962, Parliament enacted the Trustees Incorporation 
Act to provide for the incorporation of charities and associations, and subsequently, in 1967, it 
passed the Trustees Act, which regulates the position of  trustees generally. These Acts have 
                                                          
24
 Avin (1996) 1143. 
25
 F von Benda-Beckmann, Legal Pluralism in Malawi: Historical development 1858-1970 and Emerging Issues 
(2007) 37. 
26
 Section 200. 
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since been applied alongside the common law and the law relating to equity, which were 
received by virtue of the 1902 Order in Council. 
At present, public or charitable trusts are created under the Trustees Incorporation Act 
[Capitulus (Chapter or Cap) 5:02 of the Laws of Malawi] while private trusts are created under 
the common law, either by way of deed or will.  
The Trustees Incorporation Act requires public trusts to be registered with the Registrar 
General on Incorporation.27 The Registrar General keeps all the records of the trusts, including 
particulars of the trustees, but is not required to inquire into or investigate the sources of trust 
funds, and there is no requirements to inspect the accounts of the trust. Private trusts are 
prepared by way of a trust deed or will and are not required to be registered. Information on 
private trusts is, therefore, not available for inspection, nor is information regarding control and 
beneficial ownership. Such loopholes in the law have made trusts vehicles for concealing the 
identity of the grantor (settlor) and the beneficiaries, thus making the institution of trusts a 
standard part of the money laundering toolkit. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
Criminals who are involved in illicit activities for monetary gain go to great lengths to conceal 
their involvement in such activities. Usually, these criminals do not keep these ill-gotten gains in 
their own names. Trusts constitute one of the avenues used to hide the ill-gotten gains, 
particularly because of their confidential nature. The international legal framework against 
                                                          
27
 See Section 3 of the Trustees Incorporation Act (Cap 5:02 of the Laws of Malawi). 
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economic crimes obligates national jurisdictions to implement measures to improve 
transparency of legal persons and legal arrangements.28 
The purpose of this study is to identify the lacunae in the law and to suggest ways of filling 
them. As Jonathan Turner states: 
“Understanding why something is done, how it is accomplished, often provides the best 
path for defending against it.”29 
The study aims at identifying also the complementary measures to root out means of 
laundering the proceeds of crime. Denying criminals the enjoyment their ill-gotten assets, 
reduces their incentive to commit crime. An elaborate anti-money laundering regime that 
covers all the loopholes, thus immobilising all the vehicles for money laundering, will make a 
positive contribution to the economic development of Malawi. 
1.6 Theoretical premise of the study 
The theoretical basis from which the study proceeds is that, given the complex nature of the 
crime of money laundering, the money launderer will resort to whatever means possible to give 
the proceeds of crime the appearance of legality. In order to achieve this end, the money 
launderer will even risk using well-established, lawful institutions to integrate the proceeds of 
crime into the lawful economy. The author’s assumption is that lawful institutions, whether 
created by statute or developed by the common law, are less likely to attract the suspicion of 
the criminal justice authorities as instruments of money laundering. The trust, for example, is 
                                                          
28
 Recommendations 33 and 34 of the FATF Recommendations. 
29
 Turner J E Money Laundering Prevention: Deterring, Detecting. And Resolving Financial Fraud (2011) 2. 
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an ancient creation that continues to serve many legitimate purposes today. Its use or abuse as 
a means of serving illicit ends has, therefore, never been questioned throughout the ages.  
It is only very recently that bodies such as the FATF have drawn attention to the fact that 
countries need to ensure that their laws regulating trusts include clauses which make the 
creation of a trust more transparent. The FATF made this call after it became evident that 
enormous sums of money deriving from crimes were being channelled through trusts. 
Trusts are particularly vulnerable due to their confidential nature and the fact that many 
jurisdictions, including Malawi, have no strict requirements regarding the steps that should be 
followed before a trust is registered. The study will endeavour to explore how the trust is used 
to launder money at both the international and national level. The writer’s assumption is that 
closing off the trust as a money laundering vehicle will represent a significant step in Malawi’s 
efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
1.7 Research methodology 
The method used to address the issue in this study will be a straight-forward depiction of the 
scale of the abuse of the trust in Malawi, and how the courts have dealt with the problem. The 
discussion will then turn to examine the law regulating trusts to find out if it has any 
weaknesses, how they are exploitable or have been exploited by launderers, and what needs to 
be done to make the law more effective as an AML device. The study will use as its benchmark 
the standards laid down by the FATF and other initiatives aimed at blocking off the mischievous 
use of corporate vehicles for sinister purposes. 
While this research paper focuses on the situation in Malawi, the writer is well aware of the fact 
that, given the transnational nature of money laundering, it would make sense to know the 
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extent to which the ESAAMLG countries are aware of the abuse of trusts by economic 
delinquents and what measures they are contemplating putting in place at a regional level to 
prevent the manipulation of the law by launderers. It is equally important to gain a sense of 
how the public in general is apprised of the potential misuse of trusts. Media reports usually 
describe scandals, which are but symptoms of a much deeper malaise, the cure of which can 
come partly by way of legislative intervention, and partly in the observance and enforcement of 
the law. This study will address these aspects too, for in the end much depends on the 
preparedness of politicians to tackle the problem head-on. 
1.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter outlined briefly and superficially the motivation to conduct the study and the need 
to have a closer look at how the trust under Malawian law can lend itself as a tool for economic 
criminals. The next chapter will consider the international anti-money laundering legal 
framework, and how it has affected on the fight against misuse of trusts as vehicles for money 
laundering. 
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Chapter Two 
The International Legal Framework for Countering the Use of Trusts or Similar Legal 
Arrangements for Illicit Purposes 
2.1 Introduction 
The international community is working hard to minimise the risks and impact of money 
laundering. This chapter discusses the current international AML/CFT efforts to combat the use 
of trusts and similar legal arrangements for illicit purposes. Money laundering has become a 
global challenge that requires a collective response. The global fight against money laundering 
began with the UN’s adoption of the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotic Substances (the Vienna Convention of 1988). The chapter discusses how this step was 
significant in the fight against money laundering. It examines also other anti-money laundering 
initiatives and measures taken by the UN subsequently, including the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime in 2003 (The Palermo Convention) and the UN Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC, 2003). This chapter examines, too, the standards and guidelines set 
by inter-governmental bodies, such as the FATF Recommendations and the Group of 20 nations 
(G 20). 
Included in the overview are also other initiatives taken at the international level to expose and 
prevent the misuse of trusts and similar legal arrangements for money laundering purposes and 
terrorist financing. Examples of such initiatives are the Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search and Seizure of Proceeds of Crime and the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003). Both these instruments contain some anti-money 
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laundering provisions of general applicability to states parties’ anti money laundering 
initiatives. 
The above-mentioned international standard-setting agreements have been ratified or adopted 
by most countries throughout the world.  
The chapter will explore further whether there are provisions in the above-mentioned 
initiatives from which we can deduce obligations or calls for states parties to implement 
measures to combat the use of legal arrangements, including trusts, as vehicles for money 
laundering. 
2.2 The United Nations anti-money laundering initiatives 
The UN leads the global fight against money laundering. It has adopted three Conventions to 
ensure that criminals do not gain from their crimes. The Conventions are the Vienna 
Convention of 1988, the Palermo Convention of 2003 and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC). 
2.2.1 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (The 
Vienna Convention, 1988) 
The Vienna Convention is the first international legal instrument to address money laundering, 
but without using the word ‘money laundering’. As the title suggests, the rationale for the 
Convention was to curtail the illicit drug trade by, among others, identifying and confiscating 
the proceeds of drug crime.30 The Convention addresses drug-related money laundering only.31 
                                                          
30
 Art 5. 
31
 Art 3(1). 
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Article 3(1)(b) of the Convention obligates states parties to criminalise the conversion or 
transfer of property with knowledge that such property was derived from the illicit drug trade. 
The article criminalises furthermore the concealing or disguising of the illicit origins of the said 
property and the rendering of assistance to any person involved in such acts to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions.32 
The Convention provides further for the confiscation and seizure of the tainted assets by the 
competent authorities.33 
Under Article 7, parties may enter into mutual legal assistance treaties (MLA) for ease of 
investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to illicit drug trade offences.34 
This is besides the fact that Article 5(4) calls upon states parties to enter into bilateral and 
multilateral treaties to enhance their efforts to combat the illicit drug trade.35 
The Vienna Convention broke new ground by promulgating the criminalisation of money 
laundering, as we know it today, and the seizure and confiscation of illicit gains from the drug 
trade. In the meantime, the FATF has added a list of other predicate crimes of money 
laundering, besides illicit drug trafficking. Predicate crimes are actions underlying the crime of 
money laundering or the financing of terrorism. 
The Convention is further hailed for obligating states to empower their courts to override bank 
secrecy laws and to order financial institutions to make their records available to investigating 
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authorities for the purposes of tracing and confiscating unlawful assets.36 Stringent bank 
secrecy laws are convenient and friendlier to money launderers in that they protect them from 
detection, which makes such laws counterproductive to the efforts to combat money 
laundering.  
2.2.2 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (The Palermo Convention, 2000) 
The Palermo Convention is the first legally binding UN instrument dealing with transnational 
organised crime and other serious offences.37 This Convention obligates states parties to 
criminalise money laundering, not only as it relates to the drug trade, but also insofar as it is 
predicated on other serious offences, including participation in organised crime, corruption and 
obstruction of justice.38 
As regards prevention or regulation, the Palermo Convention calls upon states parties to 
implement strict anti-money laundering measures, in line with international standards and 
practice.39 The Convention addresses also the issue of asset recovery by requiring states parties 
to establish procedures for enabling the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and 
confiscation of proceeds of crime.40 
The Convention does not dictate to countries how to act; it simply urges them to criminalise the 
acts of money laundering. It is up to the states parties themselves to identify the areas and 
institutions that are vulnerable to money laundering and to draft the necessary counteractive 
regulations. 
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2.2.3 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC, 2003) 
UNCAC is one of the most comprehensive anti-corruption instruments.41 It provides an 
important link between efforts to curb corruption and the fight against money laundering. 
Corrupt activities are aimed ultimately at enjoying the illicit proceeds when laundered 
successfully. Corruption and money laundering thus stand in a symbiotic relationship to each 
other.42 The laundered assets could be proceeds of corruption, or the laundering process itself 
could be made possible by bribing some responsible officials.43 UNCAC has thus identified 
corruption as a serious offence and makes it one of the predicate crimes of money laundering 
under Article 23.44 
UNCAC imposes a general obligation on member states to implement obligations that they have 
assumed under UNCAC and which are in accordance with their national principles.45 The latter 
qualifying clause, unfortunately a characteristic of several international anti-money laundering 
instruments, is a typical ‘claw-back’ provision that a number of money laundering-friendly 
countries use as a pretext not to introduce laws that conflict with national laws.  
Article 23 covers both the person who converts or transfers property to disguise its illicit origin 
and the person who assists a person who committed the predicate offence.46 This implies that 
the person who aids a criminal to hide his proceeds of corrupt practices is regarded equally as 
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 Carr I & Goldby M (2008) The UN anti-corruption convention and money laundering. International Conference of 
the Institute of the International Economic Relations, Athens, Greece6-7 September 2008 1 available at 
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culpable as the criminal himself. Arguably, a person who creates a trust for purposes of 
converting, transferring or concealing the proceeds of corruption could be captured by this 
provision. Furthermore, a trustee who manages such funds, knowing that they are the proceeds 
of crime, would fall under the provision too. Lawyers and financial advisers who give advice to 
clients on how to launder the proceeds of their corrupt activities might be covered also by the 
wide-ranging definition in Article 23. 
A big chunk of the UNCAC text is dedicated to asset recovery.47 Article 51 asserts specifically 
that asset recovery is a fundamental principle of the Convention. Asset recovery is an important 
tool in the fight against financial crime, as the confiscation of criminally-obtained assets signals 
a clear message to potential economic delinquents that ‘crime does not pay’. Asset recovery is 
even more important for developing countries, where criminal money siphoned out of the 
national economy unlawfully can be recovered to address pressing national wants. 
2.3 The FATF Recommendations 
The FATF has a set of 50 Recommendations that set the international, soft-law standards that 
countries need to adopt to counteract money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The 
Recommendations are not legally binding, yet they have become global standards against 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism.48 Even if non-compliance has no legal 
consequences for the member states, it can result in a number of economic sanctions, since the 
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Recommendations have been adopted as world standards by economic bodies like the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.49 
The European Union (EU) has issued Directives based on the FATF Recommendations which 
constitute a common legal basis for implementing these standards within the EU. Furthermore, 
a number of countries have incorporated the FATF Recommendations into their domestic laws 
making them legally enforceable at the national level. 
The typology studies conducted by the FATF provide useful information about how money 
launderers have been reacting to the introduction of new money laundering regulations, 
especially by using alternatives to banks. The FATF typologies reports of 2006 exposed the risk 
of the misuse of corporate vehicles, including trusts as vehicles for money laundering.50 The 
specific report noted the ease with which corporate vehicles, including trusts, could be 
established anonymously and be used to conceal the proceeds of crime and its sources in some 
jurisdictions.51 The typology study is significant for the fact that it highlights the importance of 
knowing the beneficial owner of a trust, as such information is key to uncovering the source of 
the funds used to capitilise the trust. 
 In 2010 the FATF released a typology entitled Money Laundering Using Trust and Company 
Service Providers as a follow-up to the 2006 study.  The report found that jurisdictions with 
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August 2015). 
50
 FATF Typologies Report on Misuse of Corporate Vehicles, including Trust and Company Service Providers (13 
October 2006). 
51
 FATF (2006) 1. 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
unregulated trust and company service providers are at great risk of being used as platforms to 
launder money and to finance terrorism.52 
Aware of the potential risk of criminals resorting to trusts to disguise the origin of their illicit 
gains and converting them while maintaining their anonymity, the FATF extended the scope of 
Recommendations 24 and 25.53 These two Recommendations concern the transparency and 
beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements, which includes trusts. 
Recommendation 24 calls upon member countries to adopt measures to prevent the unlawful 
usage by money launderers of legal persons.54 Recommendation 25 specifically addresses the 
issue of trusts. Member countries are requested to implement laws to ensure that there is 
adequate, accurate and timely information on express trusts.55 An express trust is a trust which 
is created by the settlor, either by way of a document or orally, for the express purpose of 
creating a valid trust. The FATF requires that the document establishing the trust include the 
details of the settlor, trustee and beneficiary. The information must be accessible or obtainable 
readily and timeously by the competent authorities. 
Neither the Vienna Convention nor the Palermo Convention deals with beneficial ownership. It 
is, therefore, a crucial development that today the personal details of the settlor of a trust must 
be disclosed when the trust is registered. 
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2.3.1 Definition of ‘beneficial owner’ 
Although FATF Recommendations 24 and 25 refer to beneficial ownership of legal persons and 
arrangements, they do not define the concept ‘beneficial ownership’. However, in its glossary 
of terminology used in the Recommendations, the FATF gives the most comprehensive 
definition of the term. It defines a beneficial owner as a ‘natural person(s) who ultimately owns 
or controls a customer and/or the person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted … 
[and] also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal 
person or arrangement’.56 The Puppet Masters Report,  a Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) 
report dealing with financial and legal structures that are used to hide dirty money, shows how 
corrupt persons use legal vehicles to hide their stolen assets and how to go about counteracting 
this vice. It defines a ‘beneficial owner’ as a person or group of persons who ultimately controls 
an asset and can benefit from it.57 
This arrangement is crucial in money laundering terms, since most criminals will try their very 
best to distance themselves from their criminal activities. In the case of a trust, it may appear as 
though the property is meant for the benefit of a third party whereas, in fact, it is the settlor 
who is the ultimate controller and beneficiary of the trust. 
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2.4 The European Convention and Directives 
The EU has taken an active part in the prevention and combating of money laundering amongst 
its member states.58 There are various instruments that have been promulgated to this effect. 
The most influential ones are the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime (the EC Convention) and the three Directives on the 
prevention of the use of financial systems for the purpose of money laundering.  
2.4.1 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
Proceeds from Crime (CoE Convention, 1990)59 
This CoE Convention is a regional treaty within the EU that seeks to deal with money laundering 
and related issues. It was adopted to harmonise the anti-money practice and policy, including 
the seizure and confiscation of illicit proceeds within the EU.60 
Article 6 of the Convention provides for the money laundering offences and compels states 
parties to criminalise the conversion, concealment and acquisition of the proceeds of crime, as 
well as the participation in and aiding and abetting of such malpractices. Predicate offences 
have been defined very broadly to include ‘any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds 
were generated that may become the subject of laundering’.61 
The Convention further calls upon states parties to co-operate with one another in the 
investigation, tracing and confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and other property liable 
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to confiscation.62 Co-operation among EU states has been given much more emphasis, 
considering that money laundering has become an international problem, hence the call for 
concerted efforts on an international scale.63 
Articles 2 and 3 require of states, in general terms, to introduce laws and other necessary 
measures to enable them to identify and trace the proceeds of crime.64 Arguably, addressing 
the misuse of trusts for purposes of money laundering falls within the ambit of ‘legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary’. 
2.4.2 First Directive: Council Directive 91/308 ECC on Prevention of the Use of the Financial 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering 
This was the First Directive issued by the EU in 1991, making it an international legal instrument 
in the fight against money laundering within the EU.65 Just like the CoE Convention, the 
Directive was adopted in a drive to harmonise the anti-money laundering regime within the 
EU.66 The Directive is an expression also of a desire to bring EU law within the international 
standards set by the FATF and giving them the binding force among EU member states.67 The 
Directive recognises that banks and other financial institutions are the most common vehicles 
for money laundering, hence the need to impose the burden of detection of money launderers 
on the banks themselves.68 
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The definition of money laundering in the Directive includes the conversion or transfer of 
property derived from ‘criminal activity’ for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit 
origins of such property.69 As in the CoE Convention, the First Directive targets not only drug-
related money laundering but other criminal activities as well. In the same vein as the Vienna 
Convention and the CoE Convention, the First Directive calls upon states to put in place 
measures to confiscate the proceeds as well as the instrumentalities of the crime in question.70 
The Directive does not, however, require the criminalisation of money laundering specifically.71 
This might be because the Council of Europe, which issues the Directives, lacks legislative 
powers to lay down criminal sanctions.72 The Directive was, however, adopted having regard to 
the CoE Convention, which calls upon all member states to criminalise money laundering.73 
Article 3 requires that persons who open bank accounts or who engage in business transactions 
must identify themselves and produce evidence of the asserted identity.74 The bank or any 
other entity which is required by law to require such information must keep that information 
for five years.75 But the Directive does not go as far as to require financial institutions to be as 
punctilious about personal details of beneficial owners of corporate vehicles such as trusts. All 
the Directive requires of states is that they put in place regulatory and preventive measures in 
general terms, as the CoE Convention does. However, in 2001 the European Parliament and 
Council adopted the Second Directive to remedy the flaws in the First Directive. 
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2.4.3 Second Directive: Directive 2001/97 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 December 2001 Amending Council Directive 91/308 ECC on Prevention of the Use of the 
Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering 
As the title suggests, the Second Directive was adopted to amend the First Directive. It was 
aimed to reflect the prevailing international standards so as to protect the financial sector from 
the harmful effects of illicit financial flows.76 It sought furthermore to broaden the definition of 
money laundering by extending predicate offences to all serious crimes, unlike the First 
Directive which covered only drug-related offences.77 
The Second Directive widened further the institutions and professions covered by the directives 
to include designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), such as lawyers and 
notaries, when they act in their respective professional capacities and are involved in financial 
or corporate transactions.78 The widening of reporting entities to include DNFBPs was in 
response to the revised FATF Recommendations of 1996. 
There were no significant changes in the Second Directive that were aimed specifically at 
removing the anonymity of trusts. But the inclusion of DNFBPs as obligated bodies represented 
a crucial step forward in combating the misuse of trusts and similar legal arrangements for 
money laundering. The argument is that DNFBPs such as lawyers, estate agents and 
accountants are involved frequently in setting up trusts.79 
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2.4.4 Third Directive: Council Directive 2005/60/EC on the Prevention of the Use of the 
Financial Systems for the Purposes of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
The Third Directive was adopted in October 2005 and replaced the First and Second 
Directives.80 It is aimed at achieving consistency in the fight against money laundering within 
the EU, as well as uniformity in the EU with regard to upholding the international standards set 
by the FATF.81 This instrument emphasises the serious nature of the crime of money laundering 
and the need for increased, concerted efforts among states to reduce the incidence of money 
laundering by making it a less seductive enterprise economically.82 
The Third Directive’s significance lies in its inclusion of the need to combat the financing of 
terrorism. The preamble states categorically that massive amounts of dirty money have been 
used to finance acts of terrorism, which threaten the very foundations of society.83 This 
Directive is of especial relevance to this study in that it makes it compulsory for financial 
institutions to identify their customers in detail, including beneficial owners.84 
Importantly, Article 3(6), which is based largely on the FATF Recommendations, defines a 
‘beneficial owner’ as a ‘natural person who ultimately owns or controls the customer 
(corporate entities and trusts) and/or the natural person on whose behalf the transaction or 
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the activity is being conducted’.85 This definition has been transplanted into the national laws of  
most EU member states, with minor variations here and there.86 
2.5 The African Union (AU) Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption (AU 
Convention, 2003) 
The AU Convention provides a comprehensive anti-corruption framework for the community of 
African states. It covers a wide range of offences bordering on corruption and related 
offences.87 The Convention, which was adopted in 2003 and which came into force on 5 August 
2005, besides dealing mainly with corruption, has provisions that address the question of 
laundering the proceeds of corruption.88 
Article 6 requires states to criminalise the conversion, transfer and knowing disposal of the 
proceeds of corruption or related offences.89 It requires the criminalisation of the concealment 
or disguise of the nature as well as the whereabouts of the proceeds of crime to the extent that 
the acquisition of such property by a third party, with knowledge of its true nature and origin, 
must be criminalised also.90 
The AU Convention could, arguably, be said to be calling on member states to adopt all 
measures to fight corruption and the abuse of trusts for money laundering purposes. It 
addresses, too, the question of asset recovery, but unlike UNCAC, it does not stipulate the 
modus operandi of going about recovering the criminal assets.  
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2.6 The G20 High-level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency 
The G20 is a group of 20 of the most economically developed countries in the world which seek 
to stabilise the global economy and to avoid economic crises.91 The G20 was born as a response 
to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Its main purpose is to strengthen the global economy 
and reform international financial institutions. For some time now, this grouping of countries 
has expressed its concern about the anonymity of beneficial owners of corporate vehicles and 
how they are able to misuse such legal arrangements to give effect to their criminal purposes. 
This concern came to the fore at its summit in Pittsburg, USA, in 2009.92  Representing the 
world’s most industrialised countries, the leaders of the G20 decided to take the lead by 
incorporating FATF Recommendations 24 and 25 in their respective domestic laws.93 This step 
was prompted by the initiative of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group (ACWG),94 whose 
tasks it is to come up with recommendations on how the G20 could implement and sustain 
efforts aimed at fighting.95 The G 20 agreed to develop principles that will set out measures to 
prevent the misuse of legal arrangements like trusts for illicit purposes and ensure their 
transparency.96 
The G20 has laid down 10 principles which its members must implement in order to protect the 
integrity of their financial systems, thus protecting the integrity and transparency of the global 
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financial system.97 The principles include the definition of ‘beneficial ownership’, maintenance 
of central registries on beneficial ownership, including information on the settlor, trustees and 
beneficiaries, and measures against the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements 
intended to obstruct transparency.98 These principles have no binding legal force, but seek 
merely to encourage member countries to abide by international legal standards in the fight 
against money laundering set by UNCAC, the FATF and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). 
2.7 Conclusion 
Various international agreements discussed above have set standards aimed at preventing and 
detecting, as well as investigating and prosecuting money laundering. Contracting states under 
the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, UNCAC and regional instruments, such as the 
EU and the AU Conventions, have an obligation to criminalise the laundering of proceeds of 
crime within their respective jurisdictions. Besides the FATF detailed recommendations on what 
measures to put in place, most of the instruments described above simply call upon states to 
adopt legislative and other necessary measures to prevent the conversion, transfer 
concealment and conversion of illicit gains as well as investigate and prosecute the offenders. 
The FATF’s Recommendations 24 and 25 put in place standards regarding the identification and 
regulation of the beneficial owners of legal arrangements such as trusts. Identifying beneficial 
owners is not only important for uncovering the money laundering offences, but also for asset 
recovery. 
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The FATF has left it to each jurisdiction to make its own rules on the registration of trusts and 
the identification of the beneficial owner. The onus is now on individual member states to 
adapt the standards to suit their own respective national laws and needs. Most of the above-
mentioned instruments and initiatives have left the issue of identification of beneficial 
ownership largely to financial institutions. At present, states do not require full disclosure of 
information on all parties to a trust. 
 The next chapter examines the extent to which trusts are abused in Malawi for money 
laundering purposes and it shows what lacunae exist in the law that make the institution of the 
trust vulnerable to economic criminality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
Appraising the Trusts and Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Financing of Terrorism Regime in 
Malawi 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the current law regulating trusts in Malawi and the parts of AML/CFT law 
that addresses trusts directly or indirectly. It discusses furthermore how trusts registered in 
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Malawi are susceptible to abuse by potential money launderers. The discussion will consider 
also the extent to which the Malawian law adheres to international AML/CFT standards. 
Malawi has an anti-money laundering legal regime to prevent criminals from enjoying their ill-
gotten gains, especially from corruption and tax fraud. Malawian courts have not dealt with 
many money laundering cases, let alone those involving the misuse of trusts. This does not 
mean that such legal arrangements have not or cannot be used as vehicles for money 
laundering. The discussion below focuses on instances which have elicited allegations of the 
misuse use of trusts for nefarious purposes, and it describes the facts surrounding the ongoing 
case of The Republic v Thandizo Mphwiyo in which the accused is facing charges of using a trust 
to launder money.99 
3.2 The law of trusts in Malawi 
As noted above, Malawi distinguishes between public trusts and private trusts. The Malawi 
Supreme Court of Appeal (MSCA) has adopted the definition of this distinction as set out in 
Snell’s Principles of Equity, according to which: 
 ‘a trust is private if it is for the benefit of an individual or class irrespective of any benefit which 
may be conferred thereby on the public at large; it is public or charitable if the object thereof is 
to promote the public welfare, even if incidentally it confers a benefit on an individual or 
class.’100 
Public trusts are generally regulated by the Trustees Act and the Trustees Incorporation Act. 
The Act does not require verification of the identities of the trustees or the beneficiaries. The 
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bare personal details suffice.  What is not transparent is how the Minister goes about 
evaluating the application to register a trust and the criteria upon which his judgment rests 
ultimately. In practice, the Minister simply looks to see whether all documents required are 
before him and are in order, and whether the objectives of the trust contemplated are in the 
public interest. 
Public trusts include charities and foundations.101 The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal has 
held that charitable trusts are public trusts, although not all public trusts are charitable 
trusts.102 In Malawi, charities and foundations may be registered as trusts, non-profit 
organisations (NPOs) or companies limited by guarantee. As NPOs have no formal legal 
structure, they need only to register with the Registrar General and the Council for Non-
Governmental Organisations (CONGOMA).103  Charities and foundations registered as 
companies limited by guarantee are regulated under the Companies Act. 
Private trusts in Malawi are governed by common law. There is no statute regulating the 
registration and conduct of private trusts in Malawi. The state of the private trusts currently 
makes it easy to create and to dissolve a trust. Financial institutions are therefore not in a 
position to verify the details of the trustees and the beneficial ownership of the trusts, or even 
to ascertain whether the trust exists at all. There is no requirement that the beneficiaries be 
named under the trust deed. And since there is no oversight over the activities of private trusts, 
it may be difficult and almost impossible to identify the beneficial owner, who may not be 
mentioned specifically by the trust deed, although he maintains effective control over it. 
                                                          
101
 Section 3 TIA. 
102
 The Attorney General v. Malawi Congress Party et al (1997) 204. 
103
 See Section 24 of the Non-Governmental Organisations Act (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
The distinction between public and private trusts is further critical in respect of enforcement. 
Private trusts are enforceable by any of the named or purported beneficiaries, whereas the 
Attorney-General of Malawi enforces the public trust.104  
3.2.1 Trustees Act 
The Trustees Act does not repeal the common law notion of trust in Malawi. What it does, 
though, is to clarify the common law powers and duties of trustees, including powers of 
investment under Part II. Unlike the Trustees Incorporation Act, it relates to both public and 
private trusts. Section 3 states that the Act applies to trusts, including executorship and 
administratorship.105 This is in reference to the trusts made by way of wills and deeds under 
common law. It states further that the powers are supplementary to the powers conferred by 
the trust deed, unless a contrary intention is expressed.106 
 
 
3.2.2 Trustees Incorporation Act 
As stated in Chapter One, this Act deals only with the incorporation of public trusts or 
charities.107 Public trusts are required to be registered under the Act. Section 3 provides that 
trustees of ‘any charity for religious, educational, literary, artistic, scientific or public charitable 
purposes may apply for incorporation to the Minister responsible’.108 The Minister may also 
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receive applications from trustees of any charity which or part of which, in his or her opinion, is 
for the benefit or welfare of the people of Malawi.109 The application must include the will or 
deed, or the instrument creating the trust, and a proposed seal.110 The application must be 
accompanied too by the minutes of the meeting at which the decision to form a trust was 
made, and the names of the people who were present.111 Furthermore, the trustees must 
provide their personal particulars, which means their full names, address and occupation.112 
The trust becomes a body corporate once the Minister issues a certificate.113 The certification 
enables the trust to own and to transfer property.114 However, the Trustees Incorporation Act is 
silent on the registration of private trusts or trust deeds.  
The Act gives the Registrar General limited powers to regulate trusts. Whatever powers he 
enjoys are co-extensive with the existence of the trust.115 He has power to strike off the list any 
dormant trusts. Surprisingly, he has no obligation to investigate whether or not a trust is 
dormant. The Minister has powers to issue rules with regard to the number and forms of 
registers to be kept by the Registrar General, and he can determine as well what the functions 
of the Registrar or any supervisor should be. 116  
Section 14 of the Act requires the Registrar General to maintain a register of all incorporated 
trusts. This register is open for inspection to the public upon payment of a prescribed fee.117 
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The fee is meant essentially as an administrative fee which is used to pay for administrative 
expenses, as the government is stretched for resources. The fact that the public can gain access 
to the register gives the incorporation of public trusts or charities a measure of transparency. 
However, the challenge is with respect to the kind of personal details that are collected and 
kept.  
According to the subsidiary legislation made under this Act, the Trustees Incorporation Rules 
(TIR),118 the Registrar General handles the documentation, which is then forwarded to the 
Minister once the requirements are met.119 The Registrar General’s duty is to check whether 
the objectives of the trust are for the public benefit, as required by Section 3, whether the 
trustees have been duly authorised, whether the provisions relating to the property of the trust 
are in line with the Act, and whether the name suggested is not already taken.120 There is no 
duty on the Registrar General to collect or investigate information on the beneficial ownership 
of the trust.  
Clearly, the office of the Registrar General is crucial to the incorporation and operations of a 
trust.  The lack of a requirement under the Trustees Incorporation Act that due diligence be 
conducted in respect of settlors, trustees and beneficiaries, makes it more difficult to regulate 
trusts that are established for anti-money laundering purposes. It is often difficult for law 
enforcement officials to identify the natural person exercising management and control over 
these legal arrangements. The anonymity of beneficial ownership makes it more attractive to 
criminals to hide their identities, the sources of their finds, and the purposes for which the 
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funds are used. A worrying loophole in the law is that the Registrar General is not obligated to 
verify the personal details of the trustees and the beneficiaries and other details that are 
required. He takes the information on good faith and accepts it ‘as is’, without even enquiring 
about the sources of funds. The Act does not provide for a system of regulating the financial 
resources or funding activities relating to public trusts or charities.   
3.2.3 Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act (DEWIPA) 
Most private trusts in Malawi are created by wills (testamentary trusts or trusts under a will). 
This Act provides for the making of wills and transfer of property under wills and where a 
person dies intestate. The Act requires wills to be in writing and to be witnessed by two 
independent people.121 As is the case under common law, the intention of the testator 
prevails.122 The High Court has jurisdiction relating to all matters of granting probate of wills 
and letters of administration of estates of deceased persons.123 The High Court does not inquire 
into the origin of the deceased person’s assets, nor is it required to verify whether the listed 
property belonged to the deceased person indeed. As a result, any other assets can be added to 
the inheritance property. The problem with this practice is that even property that did not 
belong to the deceased could, theoretically, be added to the list of property in the deceased 
estate as a way of laundering such added assets. 
The finer details of applications are regulated by the Probate (Non-Contentious) Rules 
promulgated by the Minister.124  The rules require an estate duty affidavit to be filed on an 
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application for letters of administration, which must set out the nature and extent of the 
testator's estate. The court will accept the listed assets as property belonging to the testator 
without inquiring into the sources or the title deeds. DEWIPA imposes a duty on the executors 
or administrators to account regularly to the beneficiaries.125 Since the settlor is deceased, the 
trustees and the beneficiaries are the persons who are likely to misuse the trust for illicit 
purposes. 
As regards testamentary trusts, the concern is more how to protect the interests of the 
beneficiaries than to consider the possible illicit purposes to which the money may be put. 
3.2.4 Tax authorities and trusts 
 The Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) is one of the key pillars supporting the AML/CFT 
framework.126 It is required to collect information on the assets and income, as well as on the 
beneficiaries of trusts.127 Furthermore, the MRA must obtain information on the settlors, 
trustees and any beneficiaries of a trust who derive a taxable income from the trust, or who 
have a vested right to the future enjoyment of trust property. The Taxation Act states 
specifically that the Trustee Act applies to all executors and administrators of deceased 
estates.128 Public trusts are required to be registered for purposes of income tax, which is 25 
per cent of their taxable income.129 
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Individuals named as beneficiaries in a will are subject to taxation if the value of the bequest 
that they receive is within the threshold of assessable income.130 A bequest received by a 
predetermined beneficiary under a will is assessable as the income of the beneficiary and not of 
the estate.131  
Given their close knowledge of trusts and of the beneficiaries of trusts, the revenue authorities 
are better placed than anyone to know who the beneficial owners of the trusts are. The tax 
records could provide useful details about a trust which could be useful for investigative 
purposes and for the identification of the beneficial owners of the trust. 
3.3 The concept of beneficial ownership under the AML/CFT laws of Malawi 
The MLA adopts the FATF definition of beneficial ownership.132 Section 2 defines a ‘beneficial 
owner’ as 
‘a person who ultimately owns or controls a customer or the person on whose behalf a transaction is 
being conducted, and includes any person who exercises effective control over a legal person or 
arrangement.’ 
The issue of beneficial ownership also arises under Section 66, which deals with confiscation 
orders. Courts are empowered to consider for confiscation any property that is subject to the 
effective control of the person concerned.133 The section proceeds to include any trust that may 
be connected to the property in question.134 The MLA recognises that not only can trusts be 
used to camouflage stolen assets, but they can be used, too, as an obstacle to asset recovery. 
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Section 24(1) requires every financial institution to identify its customers, including beneficial 
owners, before entering into a business relationship. The identification of the beneficial owner 
is not only necessary prior to entering into a business relationship or before registration, as in 
the case of trusts, but during the period of the business relationship or the duration of the 
trust. The real beneficial owner may hide behind the apparent beneficial owner to conceal the 
true ownership of the structure concerned. It may be requiring too much of the financial 
institutions or any reporting institution to be expected to know the person behind the person 
whose name appears nowhere in the documents.  
Apart from the duty to conduct on-going CDD, financial institutions are required to understand 
the corporate structure and the legal arrangements to which they provide services. In the case 
of trusts, understanding the ownership and control structure could become apparent from 
studying the trust deed or by interviewing the trustees. 135 Financial institutions and DNFBPs are 
required to collect information on the settlor, the trustees and the beneficiaries. This 
requirement is commendable because all the three parties are relevant and must be considered 
as potential beneficial owners. The Puppet Masters note that, at the beginning of the business 
relationship, it may not be possible for the compliance officer to know what the relationship 
will involve in practice, hence the need for him to collate all information required on an on-
going basis. The wise decision is to collect information on all parties.136 
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3.4 Malawi’s experience with the misuse of trusts for purposes of money laundering and for 
other criminal reasons 
Starting  with Hasting Kamuzu Banda, the first post-independence president of Malawi, every 
Malawian head of state since has created a trust that has been  purportedly meant for 
charitable purposes, meaning in this context ‘for the benefit of the people of Malawi’.137 These 
trusts have always been controlled by the presidents themselves and have enjoyed a special, 
privileged status, thus making them susceptible to being used as vehicles for diverting public 
funds into private pockets. The Press Trust is the first trust that was created by a politician for 
the benefit of Malawians. It was followed by the Bineth Trust and the Beautify Malawi Trust. 
Each of these trusts, and the manner in which each of them was misused for illicit purposes, is 
discussed below. 
3.4.1 The Press Trust case 
The Press Trust case is a classic example where allegations have been leveled against senior 
public officials for misusing trusts to divert public funds.138 In 1969 the then President Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) created a business empire called Press 
Holdings Limited, which ventured into various businesses such as cattle ranching, tobacco 
farming, furniture making, the selling of pharmaceuticals, insurance, transport and banking.139 
Press Holdings was started with money contributions made by members of the MCP from 
money derived from the sale of party membership cards. Press Holdings had two shareholders, 
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namely, President Banda, with 499 999 shares, and Aleke Banda, with only one share. Both held 
shares ‘as nominees of the people of Malawi’.  
In 1982 President Banda settled the shares that he had in Press Holdings into the Press Trust, 
which was subsequently incorporated as a charitable trust under the Press Trust Deed, for the 
benefit of the Malawi nation. But the trust remained under Banda’s ultimate control, enjoying 
privileges such as government-guaranteed loans from local and international banks.140 Even 
though the trust had been registered as a public charitable trust, President Banda and the MCP 
maintained effective control over it. It became a quasi-public body and enjoyed preferential 
treatment since it was regarded as a development vehicle for the Malawi nation.141 President 
Banda was the beneficial owner of the trust. At the time of his death in 1997, President Banda 
was estimated to be worth in excess of $400 million, an amount believed to have been 
bankrolled largely by public funds.142 Efforts to prosecute him on charges of fraud were not 
successful and charges were dropped because of his unfitness to stand trial due to old age. 
After President Banda lost the 1993 multiparty democratic elections, the incoming government 
sought to reconstruct the Press Trust in order to benefit the people of Malawi, using the Press 
Trust (Reconstruction) Act of 1995 to gain maximum benefit. Former President Banda’s MCP 
tried to intervene legally to stop the new government’s initiative, arguing that the trust was a 
private entity and that the government’s removal of the then existing trustees and their 
replacement with new trustees amounted to an appropriation of private property interests. The 
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High Court held that the trustees are owners of the trust property and the Press Trust 
(Reconstruction) Act infringed the right of property of the existing trustees by attempting to 
deny them their property.143 The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal, overturning the High Court 
decision, upheld the validity of the Act.144 The result was that the trust property was 
transferred from the existing trustees to new trustees, with Banda and the MCP no longer in 
control. 
The Press Trust remains one of the most successful Malawian conglomerates to date, with one 
of its successful investments being the largest industrial corporate in Malawi, Press Corporation 
Limited (PCL), which controls the National Bank of Malawi.145 It is not surprising that when 
Parliament sought to reconstruct the trust, this move was opposed by the MCP. 
3.4.2 The Bineth Trust Case 
During his tenure as President of Malawi, Bingu wa Muntharika created the Bineth Trust, 
together with his wife, Ethel. 146 When he took over the reins of power in the year 2004, 
Muntharika had declared assets worth MK150 million ($1 million). At the time of his death in 
2012 he was worth approximately MK 61 billion (approximately $141 billion).147 Within a period 
of eight years he moved from being a millionaire to becoming billionaire, and this feat for 
someone who earned a monthly salary of about $12, 000.00. 
Soon after Muntharika’s death in April 2012, his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led 
government was replaced by Joyce Banda’s People’s Party (PP)-led government. The successor 
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government, in the case of Attorney General v Prof Arthur Peter Muntharika and Others, 
instituted legal action to turn Bineth Trust into a public trust. 148 Bineth Trust has properties 
worth billions of Malawi Kwachas, including Ndata Farm, a multimillion dollar mansion in 
Muntharika’s home district in Thyolo, and other residential properties. According to a suit 
brought by the Attorney-General, the Bineth Trust is a public trust which has been created for 
the benefit of Malawians. The Attorney-General therefore sought a declaration from the High 
Court in Lilongwe that the Bineth Trust is a charitable trust and an order to remove the trustees 
who were deemed to be holding office improperly and to be administering the trust as a private 
trust for the benefit of Muntharika’s family. This was going to be a repeat of the Press Trust 
case. Following the general election in May 2014, the DPP, led by Bingu’s brother Peter, the 
first defendant in the case, regained power. Soon after the DPP regained power, the incoming 
Attorney-General dropped the suit, to the dismay of ordinary Malawians.149 Even though the 
reason for dropping the case was not disclosed, the author suspects strongly that it has 
everything to do with the fact that the president is the defendant in the case and the trust is his 
brother’s property. The fact that the Attorney-General is appointed by the president supports 
this suspicion. 
3.4.3 Foundations and trusts created by the incumbent President Peter Muntharika 
Beautify Malawi Trust (BEAM) is a charitable trust incorporated by the wife of President Peter 
Muntharika. The trust has been created for the purpose of refuse management and waste 
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recycling in an effort to keep the country clean.150 There are suspicions that such charities are 
used to siphon money out of the state’s coffers. Once again, this charitable trust is purportedly 
for the benefit of Malawians. There is neither oversight over the functions of this trust, nor do 
the trustees have to account to anyone on the source of the trust funds or how they are used. 
Given the fact that the wife of the president is involved in the trust, no clear distinction can be 
drawn between the activities of the trust and the state. When the trust was launched in 
September 2015, it was reported that the trust asked for and received funds from government 
departments and the National Aids Commission (NAC).151 The use of funds earmarked for other 
purposes elicited strong protests from civil society groups that demanded that the funds be 
returned, and the funds have indeed since been returned to the state. What is apparent is that 
such a trust is politically exposed and there are serious risks that it is susceptible to being used 
as a vehicle for diverting public funds for the private interests of those who ultimately control 
its operations.  
3.4.4 The case of The Republic v Thandizo Mphwiyo 
This is one of the Cashgate cases involving the wife of the former Director of Budget in the 
Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) of Malawi. 152  At the time of writing, the accused, 
Thandizo Mphwiyo, is facing money laundering charges for having infringed Section 35 of the 
Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act (hereafter the MLA). 
The charges allege that Mphwiyo has laundered money worth MK50 million through a fictitious 
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trust known as Good Deeds Trust. The allegations state that Mphwiyo used the fictitious trust 
to buy a house in the alleged amount, knowing or having reason to believe that such money 
was the proceeds of crime. The particulars of the charge are that Thandizo Mphwiyo and others 
are trustees of the trust. Thandizo’s husband, Paul Mphwiyo, is not a trustee, but is answering 
charges in another matter. Both cases are still in progress.  
3.5 Recent developments in AML/CFT in Malawi 
This section deals with the AML/CFT developments that have taken place in Malawi since the 
enactment of the MLA in 2006. The focus is on the regulations to the AML legislation and, in 
particular, what they say about trusts and beneficial ownership. The section below discusses 
also the process of amending the MLA which started soon after the FATF revised its 
Recommendations and subsequent to ESAAMLG’s conducting a mutual evaluation of the 
effectiveness of Malawi’s AML measures in 2008. The discussion relates only to matters 
connected to trusts and beneficial ownership. 
3.5.1 Anti-money laundering regulations (2011) 
The AML Regulations provide specifically for a risk-based approach to CDD. By risk-based 
approach is meant that financial institutions dedicate most of their resources to conducting 
more rigorous due diligence on the higher risk customers or accounts. Regulation 3(4) requires 
a risk-based CDD approach when dealing with non-resident customers, private banking 
customers, legal entities, public officials, customers who have been refused a service by 
another institution, and other specified categories of customers, including beneficial owners of 
corporate structures or legal arrangements, and business relationships.  
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
The regulations require further that financial institutions take reasonable measures to identify 
the beneficial owners of legal persons and trusts.153 The term ‘beneficial owner’ is defined as 
the person who ultimately owns, controls, manages the customer,154 or who benefits from the 
customer.155 However, the regulations do not say how the financial institution must find out the 
information relating to such persons or entities. But they stipulate that where the financial 
institution fails to identify the beneficial owner, it must not proceed to enter into a business 
relationship, and where such relationship already exists it must terminate it, and must file a 
suspicious transaction report (STR) with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) or proceed as 
advised by the FIU.156  
 Financial institutions are required to obtain full particulars and details of every trustee and 
settlor, as well as of the persons who are the senior managers of a trust.157 What is more, the 
financial institution must obtain particulars of any person authorised to enter into a business 
relationship with the trust and any named beneficiaries of the trust, or the manner in which the 
beneficiaries will be determined.158 Under common law, trustees have a duty of confidentiality 
which prevents them from revealing certain information, including the details of the settlor and 
the beneficiaries.159 Trustees are thus trapped in a conflict situation which requires them to 
comply with AML/CFT laws on the one hand, and on the other, to uphold their duty to maintain 
confidentiality as trustees. The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 25 of the FATF calls on 
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countries to abolish laws that prevent trustees from disclosing information regarding the trust 
to the competent authorities and the reporting institutions.160 Section 44 of MLA gives effect to 
the FATF Recommendation by providing that the Act ‘shall have effect notwithstanding any 
obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on disclosure of information imposed by any other 
written law or otherwise, if the court so orders’.161 This means that the law in Malawi provides 
for certain scenarios where a court order may be obtained to prevent the withholding of 
information.  
Paragraph 2 of the Interpretive Note to FATF Recommendation 25 calls on states to remove all 
legal obstacles that prevent trustees, financial institutions or DNFBPs from providing the 
competent authorities with information on a trust, and on the beneficial owner of the trust. To 
this extent, Section 44 is in conflict with the above-mentioned Interpretive Note so far as it 
relates to the duty of confidentiality by trustees. A court order may still stand in the way of 
obtaining information on trusts.  
Neither the MLA nor the AML Regulations places a positive duty on the trustees to provide 
information on the trust. All they do is to require the reporting institutions to extract 
information out of the trustees without imposing a corollary duty on the trustees to provide the 
information. Where a trust is used to hide the true ownership of assets, it may not be easy for 
the financial institutions and any reporting institution to identify the person who pulls the 
strings ultimately. The financial institutions are required to understand the operations and the 
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control structure of the trust in their dealings so as to identify the beneficial owners.162 This 
task could be fulfilled only if trustees are forthcoming with the information. The trustees must, 
therefore, be required by law to disclose the information regarding the settlor, beneficiaries 
and source of funds.  
The regulations direct that information obtained about trusts should be verified 
independently.163 Financial institutions are required to verify independently the trust deeds (or 
any other founding document creating the trust) or certificates of incorporation with the 
Registrar General.164 Independent verification also extends to information regarding the settlor, 
trustees and the purported beneficiaries.165 When dealing with a foreign trust, the authenticity 
of the documents presented must be sought from the jurisdiction where the trust is 
registered.166 There is no guidance on where to start the verification process in foreign 
countries, or what the credible sources for such documents are. However, where it is 
impracticable for the financial institution to obtain this verification, it may make use of other 
available, reliable documents, having regard to the risk posed by such use.167 In the case of a 
foreign-registered trust, the financial institution must know in which jurisdiction where the 
trust is registered.168 For example, trusts that are registered in jurisdictions with weak AML/CFT 
laws, or in tax havens, carry a higher risk of money laundering and must be dealt with 
cautiously.  
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The verification process in Malawi relies heavily on the information kept with the Registrar 
General. But the difficulty lies in the fact that the Registrar General is not required to have all 
the information, and whatever information he has is not updated.169 What complicates matters 
even further is that registration is effected manually and not electronically, which means that 
the process is slow and there is always the risk that paper files can be mislaid or lost.170 A 
computerised registry would save time and effort, and would ease access to information. 
Manual procedures are tedious and make it difficult to update information in accordance with 
what the law prescribes. What is more, the information that the Registrar General has on a 
trust is sketchy, let alone the fact that it has not even been verified. All that is required of him is 
to collect information on the parties to the trusts and on the instruments creating the trusts. 
The Minister, too, who issues the certificate of incorporation, is not duty-bound  to carry out an 
independent verification.  
Trusts are appealing to criminals due to the anonymity of the beneficial owner and the 
obscurity of the source of funds. It is therefore, commendable that the regulation now makes it 
obligatory to identify the beneficial owner.  
As the Malawian economy is predominantly cash-based, not all trusts may require the services 
of a financial institution in order to be registered. Some trusts may only be involved in activities 
which do not necessarily require the services of a financial institution, for example, the 
acquisition and management of real estates. The regulations impose obligations on ‘financial 
institutions’ instead of the recommended ‘reporting institution’. Since the regulations were 
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made before the FATF extended the reporting requirement to DNFBPs, Malawi has since not 
updated them to reflect this change. There is, therefore, a need to update the regulations so as 
to make the reporting duty extend to DNFBPs as well. 
3.5.2 The draft amendment to the Money Laundering Act 
The MLA has been in force since 2006, but it was only in August 2014 that the court convicted 
someone for contravening it.171 It is indeed regrettable that, while international AML/CFT 
standards keep developing and adapting to new money laundering trends, Malawi’s AML 
regulations of 2005 and 2011 have not been revised since they saw the light of day in 2006 and 
2011 respectively. At the time of writing, a consultant has been appointed to work on a draft 
bill to amend the MLA so as to reflect the changes to the FATF Recommendations, Interpretive 
Notes and best practices made in 2012. 
The current MLA was enacted in 2006 and is based on the FATF Recommendations, as revised 
in 2003. There is a need to update the MLA to reflect the 2012 revision to the FATF 
Recommendations which, among others, place a high premium on countries’ adopting the risk-
based approach when conducting customer/client due diligence procedures. The draft 
amendment of the MLA includes specific requirements relating to the implementation of a risk-
based approach, the inclusion of DNFBPs as reporting institutions, and a chapter on civil asset 
forfeiture.172  
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The draft bill is yet to be tabled in parliament. Unfortunately, the entire process has taken 
much too long, a fact which shows the lackadaisical manner in which the relevant authorities 
have gone about implementing the FATF Recommendations.   
3.5.3 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report for Malawi 
In 2008, as part of the FATF Recommendations enforcement mechanism, the FATF-styled body, 
ESAAMLG, of which Malawi is a member, and the World Bank, carried out a joint Mutual 
Evaluation exercise on Malawi on behalf of the FATF. The main findings are contained in the 
Mutual Evaluation Report (hereafter MER 2008) and these are set out below. 
3.5.3.1 Key Findings 
MER 2008 rated Malawi as non-compliant on FATF Recommendation 12, which requires 
politically exposed persons (PEPS) to be subjected to CDD. The reason for conducting CDD on 
PEPs is to find out whether or not they are beneficial owners of entities. MER 2008 was critical 
of the fact that, in the case of trusts, financial institutions carry out identifications procedures 
identify only with regard to trustees, and not beneficiaries too.173 
MER 2008 found that Malawi is partly compliant with Recommendation 25, which requires that 
competent authorities obtain  ‘accurate and timely information on express trusts, including 
information on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries’ to avoid  trusts being used as money 
laundering vehicles.174 MER 2008 regretted the fact that, because private trusts are not 
required to be registered, the authorities have no way of finding out who the beneficial owners 
of such trusts are, which renders this type of trust vulnerable to misuse. 
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 3.5.3.2 Recommendations of the Mutual Evaluation Report  
MER 2008 recommended that Malawian authorities remind financial institutions and DNFBPs to 
adhere to the CDD prescriptions enunciated in FATF Recommendation 10 and that private 
trusts be registered and that information on the beneficial ownership of trusts be made 
accessible for public inspection.175 Importantly, MER 2008 recommended that information on 
incorporated trusts be kept current through regular updating.176 
MER 2008 noted, too, the need to switch from manual to electronic data capturing and 
commended the steps underway to do so. 
In sum, the Mutual Evaluation exercise was useful. The gist of the recommendations was that 
CDD needs to be conducted in a manner which ensures that crucial information is obtained 
across the board and not in the fragmented manner that has been the order of the day until 
now. This recommendation makes much sense, as key data captured on computer can be cross-
referenced effortlessly, making it easier to untangle byzantine legal arrangements that elude 
the employee who has enough trouble sorting out piles of paper on his desk and preventing 
them from tumbling into each other and falling onto the floor, flitting all over the place. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Trusts are registered for particular legitimate purposes, be they private or public. The 
discussion above shows that some public trusts created in Malawi are vulnerable to being 
misused to divert public funds for unlawful, private benefit. The potential for anonymity is a 
crucial factor in enabling the abuse of particular legal arrangements for illicit purposes. FATF 
                                                          
175
 Para 504 MER. 
176
 Para 504 MER. 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
Recommendation 25 obligates national authorities to put in place laws and structures which 
require that such information be collected, maintained and made available in a timely fashion. 
Information on beneficial ownership plays a vital role in the detection of misuse of corporate 
vehicles including trusts for illicit purposes.  
Malawi has, no doubt, made efforts to comply with the international standards set by the FATF, 
though full compliance has yet to be attained. Law enforcement officers are hard put to gaining 
access to information when the kind of information they are looking for is not collected in the 
first place. There is no gainsaying the fact that the present state of Malawian law on trusts 
creates ample opportunity for economic criminals to use the trust trusts for money laundering 
purposes. The justice authorities need to address the loopholes in the law as a matter of 
urgency. The most important change needed, at the macro level, is to implement a method of 
collecting important data intelligently and make trust documents readily accessible for public 
and investigative scrutiny.  
In general, it is regrettable that ESAAMLG is not playing a more proactive role in helping 
countries to meet FATF requirements. It is easy to find fault and to recommend what needs to 
be done, but what is needed is the know-how, which ESAAMLG does not offer. But Malawi 
needs to take the initiative itself. With African economies becoming more and more integrated, 
especially at the regional level, it is becoming increasingly necessary to harmonise sectoral 
policies, especially with regard to macroeconomic and financial policy. Money laundering 
should, therefore, become a major regional concern, and fighting it requires harmonization of 
anti-money laundering laws and policies.  In researching this study, the author found no 
concrete evidence of a serious intent within the states comprising the regional economic 
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community known as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), of which 
Malawi is a member, to deal with trusts as money laundering vehicles. Unless member states of 
COMESA, and other regional economic communities in Africa, devote more urgent attention to 
combating the misuse of the trust as a money laundering device, huge sums of money will 
continue to be siphoned out of Africa, to the detriment of the peoples of the continent.   
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Chapter Four 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1 General Conclusions 
Criminals do not like to keep dirty money in their own name. They try as hard as possible to 
distance themselves from it, for the further they lay it away from them, the less likely that they 
will be associated with the loot or with the crime. This study has revealed the loopholes in the 
Malawian law on trusts, and it has shown these to be archaic and in need of updating. Although 
Malawian courts have, until the time of writing, not yet decided a case in which a trust has 
been used as a vehicle for illicit purposes, the danger that trusts could be used for sinister 
purposes remains real.  Malawi lacks the resources to conduct proper investigations into money 
laundering, especially when the trail of the dirty money leads to a destination off-shore. But 
even if an investigation in a foreign country would be successful, the hurdle of getting the 
criminal will still have to be overcome. Besides, as shown earlier, the main problem facing any 
investigator is that private trusts are not required to be registered, which means that the 
identity of the beneficial owner of the trusts is unknown.  
The following recommendations are therefor made on how to regulate trusts more stringently: 
4.2 Amending the Trust Law 
As a member of ESAAMLG, Malawi has committed itself to implementing the FATF 
Recommendations. One of the Recommendations is that trusts must be registered. It is 
submitted that the registration process should be subject to the application of risk-based 
procedures. Malawi, therefore, needs first to introduce a provision in its law regulating trusts 
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which makes it compulsory for private trusts to be registered with the Registrar General. The 
legal provision must require that, before the Registrar General issues any letter of 
administration, he or she must be furnished with the personal details of all parties to the trusts, 
namely, settlor or principal, the trustee, beneficiary, as well as the details of the capital amount 
of the property concerned, and its physical location. The Trustees Incorporation Act must 
render any unregistered trust invalid under the laws of Malawi.  
Second, the law must require the Registrar General to verify independently all the information 
furnished, just as is required of banks, for example, before doing business with a customer. The 
law must comply with FATF Recommendation 10, in particular.  
Third, the Registrar General must be obligated to know the source of the trust funds or assets 
and must be required furthermore to verify the source or sources independently. The need for 
this requirement stems from the fact successive Malawian heads of state have created trusts, 
ostensibly for the public good, but without disclosing any other information about the trust.  
Fourth, even though the FATF Recommendations contain no such requirement, it is submitted 
that trustees must be required to submit to the Registrar General on a yearly basis an annual 
accounts statement which shows amounts flowing into and out of the trust and by whom and 
to whom the money was paid.  These annual accounts returns will assist the Registrar General 
in monitoring trusts to prevent or to stop their being misused to launder money. Alternatively, 
the law needs to authorise the Registrar General to summon a trustee to account for the 
disbursements of a trust. South African law, for example, provides for such accounting. Section 
16 of the Trust Property Control Act authorises the Master of the High Court, the equivalent of 
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the Malawian Registrar General, to produce records of the accounts and administration of the 
trust and answer all questions relating to it. 177  The Master may require such records to be 
produced with respect to the administration of any trust property.  
The requirement to furnish information on a trust should be balanced against the need to 
protect the right to privacy, especially given the danger that public information about a trust 
could be exploited by some people for malicious purposes. To offset this possibility, it would be 
necessary to restrict public access to particular information. At present, anyone can access this 
information by simply paying a search fee. It is submitted that this information should be 
accessible to investigators in cases of suspected money laundering. 
However, given the common law duty of trustees to keep confidential the information on the 
trusts that they administer, as well as who the beneficial owner of the trust is, it would be 
necessary for the MLA to state explicitly that the duty of confidentiality does not apply against 
any reporting institution conducting CDD and against any competent authority, as defined by 
the MLA.  
4.3 Executive Action 
The FATF puts the primary responsibility of implementation of its recommendations on the 
state. Pushing for legislation is only one way of fulfilling its obligations. It is submitted that the 
following measures be introduced to supplement the AML/CFT legal framework: 
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4.3.1 Undertaking a national risk assessment 
As a general AML/CFT preventative exercise, Malawi needs to conduct a national risk 
assessment in order to understand more fully how vulnerable the national economy is to 
money laundering. The FATF peer evaluation report has identified a number of vulnerabilities. 
These need to be addressed first. But over and above what has been pointed out by the FATF 
peer review report, the government should know what other areas in the economy are 
potentially exploitable by money launderers. Fortunately, the government has realised this 
need and started a risk assessment exercise in 2013. However, this exercise has, at the time of 
writing, yet to be concluded. 
4.3.2 Introducing a national identification system 
Malawi citizens have no identity cards, which makes it difficult for them and for state agencies 
and other entities in the private sector to verify their identity. Drivers’ licences and passports 
are usually used to verify the identities of those who possess such documents. But few 
Malawians can afford to have such documents, for they cost money. The existence of a national 
identification system would go a long way to ease the life of citizens and would be very 
beneficial for procedures that require a verification of someone’s identity, especially in regard 
to AML/CFT precautionary procedures.  
4.3.3 Investing in information technology 
Malawi suffers from a shortage of information technology, which is a glaring pitfall in the 
country’s AML/CFT efforts. The government and the private sector need to make a concerted 
effort, even if it is by way of forging a partnership, to ensure that the way in which information 
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is stored is brought into line with 21st century standards. This is essential for the economic well-
being of both the economy and for enabling Malawi to stay abreast of the tricks used by 
launderers, who can play havoc with systems that still depend heavily on information stored on 
perishable paper. Admittedly, Malawi has serious capacity constraints on this front. But these 
could be bridged by enlisting the assistance and expertise of organisations that have a keen 
interest in combating money laundering, such as the FATF, ESAAMLG, the World Bank and the 
OECD. In fact, the FATF could play a useful role, given the fact that its Recommendation 25 
requires states to keep information on trusts which is accurate, up to date and can be 
accessible in a timely fashion.178 
4.3.4 Making use of the tax authorities to combat money laundering 
As stated in the previous chapter, in Malawi trusts are taxable. The Malawi Revenue Authority 
can be used to unmask the people behind a trust. The information gained from tax authorities 
could thus be very useful in identifying the beneficial owners of trusts.  
The longer it takes to implement the international standards, the more time criminals have to 
exploit the existing weaknesses. The amendments suggested above are not radical, and they 
are eminently practicable.  
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